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“The current system is no good”: The challenges 
of Singapore’s domestic work industry 
WHAT’S THE PROBLEM? 
“The current system is no good,” says the 
employment agent emphatically. He runs one of 
the largest employment agencies in Singapore 
and has been active within the industry for nearly 
20 years.  
Punctuating his point by hitting the table with the 
palm of his hand, he says: “I introduce the maid 
to you, I charge you 6-7 months of salary 
deductions. After the maid finishes the 6-7 
months, if the employer’s got a problem, she 
comes to me. Honestly speaking, what is inside 
my heart? I’m standing opposite from you. It’s 
better you change maids. If you change, I can 
charge the maid again. Or I send her back, and 
then I let her re-enter Singapore; I charge another 
6-7 months. It’s very cruel, but in the business 
world, this is how it happens.” 
Employers are heavily reliant on workers’ 
assistance with domestic labour and care work: 
one of five resident households in Singapore 
employs a migrant domestic worker (Department 
of Statistics Singapore 2016). Agents facilitate 
Singapore’s continued dependence on migrant 
labour for domestic help. They perform the 
everyday tasks which make the inflow of 
domestic labour possible: they liaise with 
overseas recruitment companies, screen and 
match workers to Singaporean employers, and 
intervene when employment relationships go 
sour.   
However, the migration industry is often 
criticised as opaque and exploitative. 
Employment agents are castigated as villainous 
and extractive, ready to profit from vulnerable 
migrants with little access to information or 
capital (Lindquist, Xiang, and Yeoh 2012), or out 
to bamboozle employers to earn more money. 
Common complaints from employers have included 
the payment of astronomical upfront costs, hiring 
workers who are poorly equipped to handle care work 
and household chores, and the difficulty of retaining 
good workers over long periods of time. Additionally, 
the industry is bloated with business. At first glance, it 
appears that the migration industry flourishes at an 
exponential rate: in 2013, there were 1,129 licensed 
employment agencies which place migrant domestic 
workers; as of Sept 2016, there are 1,456, a 28.9% 
increase. However, the bulk of these employment 
agencies are inactive, or place a negligible number of 
workers: 516 (35.4%) have placed zero domestic 
workers in the past year, and only 663 – or 45.5% – 
have recruited and placed an average of 20 domestic 
workers or more per month.  
Migrant domestic workers work for an average of 7-9 
months with little to no pay in order to repay 
placement loans, which average SGD $3,600 (Platt et 
al. 2013). These fees are naturalised as the inevitable 
cost of migration. The debt-financed migration system 
has produced a host of problems, such as protracted 
salary deductions, agents racking up workers’ loans by 
frequently redeploying them to new employers 
without serious attempts to mediate problems in 
employer-employee relationships, and employers 
tightening control over domestic workers in order to 
protect their loan ‘investments’.   
METHOD 
Using a mixture of purposive stratified and snowball 
sampling techniques – based on agencies’ retention 
rates, placement volumes and accreditation types – 
we conducted in-depth interviews with a range of 
employment agency managers, trainers, directors, 
and frontline staff members in Singapore (n=28). We 
mapped their cross-border ties, recruitment and 
matching techniques, and other features of their 
business. To triangulate our information, we  
Employment agents who match migrant domestic workers to Singaporean employers play a critical role 
in the way Singapore’s migration industry is currently structured: they set fees, create job matches, 
intervene when fissures appear, and shape migration flows between Singapore and countries of origin. 
Based on 47 interviews with employment agents and other key actors in Singapore and Indonesia, we 
break down the cost components for both employers and workers, pay attention to the flow of money 
across the migration industry rather than the sum costs, and show how the employer, agent and worker 
are tightly bound in a complicated web of debt. Employers become contractually liable for defaulted 
loans and must pay high upfront fees, while workers’ vulnerability and stress are heightened by 
protracted salary deductions. We suggest that Singapore would benefit from better labour protections 
and more thorough skills differentiation for workers, as well as policies to prevent agents from collecting 
placement loans on behalf of their overseas counterparts.  
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interviewed a few key actors within the industry (n=6), including 
representatives from CaseTrust, embassies, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and the Association of Employment 
Agencies (Singapore) (AEAS). Part of the fieldwork also took 
place in Indonesia, which builds on previous research on 
Indonesian domestic workers conducted by our team; 
significantly, the largest group of domestic workers in Singapore 
is also from Indonesia. We spoke to recruitment company 
owners, managers, trainers, and administrative staff, former 
domestic workers, brokers and sponsors, government actors, 
and NGO representatives (n=13). 
We also made use of a number of complementary techniques: 
informal conversations, on-site participant observation, follow-
up interviews, the creation of a media archive charting local 
news coverage of the migration industry, and the collection and 
analysis of a large number of documents related to the 
migration industry.  
THE COSTS OF DOMESTIC WORK  
Singaporean employers pay the Singapore agent two sets of 
costs when hiring a domestic worker through an employment 
agency. First is a fee for the agent’s services. The second is the 
mandatory local employment costs (MLEC) associated with 
hiring any migrant domestic worker, such as the costs of the 
Settling-in Programme, the Work Permit application, a medical 
check-up, and insurance coverage.  
While the MLEC amounts to a fairly fixed cost for employers, the 
service fee may range from as little as SGD $38 to SGD $2,000. 
This wide variation might be due to a number of factors, such as 
a worker’s nationality, an agency’s business strategy, and the 
‘replacement policy’ offered by an agency should the 
employment relationship fail. Some service fees encompass the 
MLEC while others might not.   
On top of this, the employer also pays for the cost of the 
Employer Orientation Programme if they are first-time 
employers. Additionally, they purchase a $5,000 security bond, 
and, if ineligible for the concessionary levy, pay a monthly 
foreign domestic worker levy of SGD $265 to the government  
(Ministry of Manpower 2015a).  
Workers also pay two sets of fees. They pay Singapore agents a 
service fee, which is regulated by the Employment Agencies Act: 
for two years of work, the service fee is capped at a maximum 
of two months’ salary (Ministry of Manpower 2015b). The 
average salary earned by an Indonesian worker per month 
ranges between SGD $450-$550, meaning that this service fee 
may range from SGD $900 to $1,100.  
The second fee is a placement loan, which is what a worker owes 
her Indonesian recruitment company for costs such as training, 
accommodation, visa and passport applications, transport, and 
so on. This may range from SGD $2,240 to $3,550. 
These fees are illustrated in Infographic 1. The analysis of 
financial flows in Infographic 1 implies the employer and the 
worker are key nodes through which the payment of debt is 
facilitated. 
 
Infographic 1: Breakdown of payments by employer and worker 
However, if we pay attention to the flow of money (as in 
Infographic 2) we can see that it is actually the employer and the 
agent – not the worker herself – who most immediately deal 
with the repayment of the worker’s debt.  
The employer pays the fairly fixed MLEC costs to various 
institutions and other parties, but also pays her service fee, her 
worker’s service fee and her worker’s placement loan to the 
Singapore agent, who then purportedly remits the loan to her 
Indonesian counterpart.  
 
Infographic 2: Flow of payments through the migration industry 
These payments flow smoothly only if the worker’s employment 
relationship with the employer is successful and she works for a 
sufficient period of time. With an average retention rate of 51.78 
per cent, 48.22 per cent of workers placed by employment 
agencies in Singapore either transfer to a new employer or 
return home after less than a year with the same employer 
(Ministry of Manpower 2016). If the employment relationship 
breaks down before the worker has finished repaying her debt 
 
 
to this specific employer, the placement loan and/or a service 
fee between an employer and the agent have to be 
reconfigured. Depending on the contract and the agent’s 
assessment of the situation, this takes place in a number of 
ways.  
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
What does this debt-financed migration regime mean for 
workers and employers? 
Employers pay thousands upfront. Because the loan is 
frontloaded onto the worker’s first 7-9 months on the job, 
employers must pay a few thousand dollars upfront in order to 
secure a worker. For some employers, this is beyond what they 
can afford; a frontline agent from a major employment agency 
says: “Some employers come from a poor family, frankly 
speaking. They come and tell me, they even cry. ‘My father just 
got a stroke, 60 over years old, and nobody is working. Madam, 
I really got no money.’” 
Workers suffer unlimited additions to their loans. If a worker 
has worked less than six months before her employment 
relationship ends, the agency is required to refund her one 
month’s service fees. However, when she begins a new contract, 
she will be charged two months’ fees – thus adding one month 
to her loan. This might become a profit-making strategy for 
some agents: if agents deliberately mismatch workers or are 
willing to cycle workers indefinitely within their pool of 
employer clients, the additional one month’s salary becomes a 
quick way of racking up profits. Within the industry, this is a 
practice known as ‘churning’ or ‘recycling’. Workers who are 
‘churned’ are caught in eternally ballooning debts which are 
very difficult to pay off.  
Employers are liable for unpaid loans. In the event that an 
employer repatriates a worker with unpaid loans instead of 
seeking a replacement with the agency, the employer is usually 
held contractually liable for the remainder of the placement 
loan. This binds the employer in a relationship with an agency 
that they might no longer wish to hire from – and forms the basis 
from which conflicts often erupt.  
Workers face extreme stress, which may result in high turnover 
rates. For a worker who is experiencing her first sojourn away 
from home, enduring the passage of 7-9 months without any 
pay or receiving only a nominal fee of SGD $10-$20 is a 
profoundly stressful experience (Platt et al. 2013). She is unable 
to remit any money home or have the financial freedom to 
purchase items that she might need. A prolonged salary 
deduction period also contributes to cracks in the employment 
relationship as the worker struggles with these pressures: the 
owner of a mid-sized agency says, “If you take everything and 
[workers] don’t see money for six months, then they are 
thinking, ‘I don’t want to work already.’” Low retention rates 
(Ministry of Manpower 2016) and the high volume of domestic 
workers seeing help from NGOs within their first six months of 
placement are evidence of this issue (J. Gee, personal 
communication, September 16, 2016). 
Workers experience conditions of control and compliance. The 
current system depends on isolating and immobilising migrant 
workers to ensure their repayment of the placement loan. An 
agent who runs her agency in Singapore’s heartlands says that 
employers feel like they are “buying” the workers (and hence 
have the wherewithal to do as they please) because of the risky 
investment of high upfront costs. Agents – who may have an 
interest in minimising potential conflicts arising from disruptions 
in salary repayments – might confer with employers about 
withholding days off, reducing mobility outside the home, and 
controlling mobile phone usage until the loan has been properly 
repaid. As a result, workers endure a protracted period of 
isolation and vulnerability.  
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Positioning Singapore as a country of destination 
 
Singapore’s structural dependence on migrant domestic 
workers increases the stakes of attracting a sufficient number of 
qualified workers to its shores. To continue doing so, Singapore 
must compare favourably with other migrant domestic work 
destinations in the region. Employment agents have expressed 
fears of a lack in the number and ‘quality’ of women who come 
to work in Singapore, especially since Indonesian workers make 
up the largest number of domestic workers in Singapore and are 
in high demand by Singaporean employers. Agents note that, in 
comparison to Hong Kong and Taiwan, the salaries offered in 
Singapore are significantly lower, Singaporean employers are 
known to be especially demanding, and the repayment of 
placement loans is more onerous. In order to maintain a steady 
stream of workers, Singapore should consider aligning itself to 
shifting global labour standards, where domestic workers are 
formally protected by labour acts and have the option to live-
out. While Indonesian domestic workers appreciate Singapore’s 
geographical proximity and safety, a familiar tropical climate, 
and the ease of learning English compared to Cantonese or 
Mandarin, it would be prudent to proactively ensure that 
Singapore enhances its attractiveness as a destination country 
by following in the steps of the legislation of the day-off policy 
to improve working conditions for migrant domestic workers 
(Koh et al. 2016).  
 
Recognise skills differentiation within the industry 
 
With the projection that one in five residents will be aged 65 and 
above by 2030, the demand for skilled caregivers is slated to 
increase in Singapore. Especially with the Ministry of Health’s 
plans to support home-based eldercare and aging-in-place, live-
in caregivers feature prominently in Singapore’s care plans. 
Employers prefer hiring a migrant domestic worker for eldercare 
to hiring a local nurse or sending an elderly person to a nursing 
home, but migrant domestic workers are often under-qualified 
and under-supported in tending to the serious medical 
conditions of elderly persons. Introducing a two-tiered visa 
system that distinguishes the job scope of caregivers from 
general household service workers would attract qualified and 
professional healthcare talent well-equipped to care for elderly 
Singaporeans, and better calibrate the services of caregivers and 
general household workers to the needs of Singaporeans 
households. The differentiated visa should also reflect 
differentiated working conditions, such as better salaries and 
benefits, and potentially even a live-out option, in order to be 
meaningfully attractive to experienced caregivers. At this 
juncture when other countries of destination are keen to recruit 
healthcare talent and countries of origin are increasingly 
reluctant to send unskilled workers abroad, these measures that 
acknowledge and remunerate a tier of caregivers above general 
household workers could be in order. 
 
Collect placement fees in source countries 
The Work Permit system ties each migrant domestic worker to 
an employer who pays upfront for the worker’s recruitment and 
placement fees, before recovering them through salary 
deductions. While this arrangement makes labour migration 
accessible to women without capital, it can also compound the 
vulnerability of women during the months of salary deduction. 
Not only do workers receive little remuneration during this 
period, employers often isolate workers to recuperate their 
loans. Further, the transactions between employment agents in 
countries of origin and destination are informal, transnational, 
and prove hostile to regulation, creating opportunities for the 
worker to be charged more than is due. The recent Household 
Service Workers Industry Scheme (HIS) spearheaded by the 
Indonesian government in collaboration with the Association of 
Employment Agencies in Singapore seeks to eliminate the 
collection of placement costs on the behalf of Indonesian 
recruiters. It remedies the fudging of placement costs by 
conferring on each worker a loan from a bank in Indonesia. We 
cautiously affirm that this scheme could be a step in the right 
direction.  
However, there are also some implications to this migration 
regime which must be carefully considered (see, for e.g., Goh et 
al. 2016). Limiting the payment of placement costs to the 
country of origin is a fundamental change to the current regime 
of the migration industry and might produce unexpected 
consequences, such as workers having to raise upfront fees 
before coming to Singapore and hence powerfully limiting the 
number of workers able to migrate here for work. The ripple 
effects of such a change for Singapore might be best anticipated 
by detailed and regular consultations with employment 
agencies, civil society, and the Indonesian government. 
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